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I. IDENTITY AND MULTIPLICITY
The publication of the following three articles creates an oppor-
tunity to consider the multiple roles of the lawyer and what I will call
multidimensional lawyering - lawyering that accounts for the ways
in which these sometimes colliding, sometimes intersecting, some-
times diverging roles expand our vision of lawyers' ethics. One of the
peculiarities of the field of law known variously as "professional re-
sponsibility," "the legal profession" or "professional ethics" is its ex-
cessive focus on the lawyer's role in relation to the client. Lawyers
like me who teach professional responsibility tend to think about the
lawyer-client relationship as the primary if not the organizing princi-
ple of this field. This client-focused approach to ethics is apparent, for
example, in the casebooks, problem books and treatises in this area.
After the obligatory opening chapters on the nature of the legal pro-
fession, the books invariably turn next to aspects of the lawyer-client
relationship, which dominate the texts.' Only then are multiple role
t Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B. Cornell
University 1979; M.H.S.A., J.D. University of Michigan 1981, 1986. I am grateful to
Professors Robin Paul Malloy and Janis L. McDonald for their always thoughtful feed-
back on an early draft, as well as to my research assistant Stewart A. Pollock who, as
usual, was extraordinarily reliable. This introductory article is dedicated to the mul-
tidimensional spirit of F. Gerard Plater.
1. The interested reader can verify this statement easily by glancing over the table of
contents of the following casebooks: STEVEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (3d ed. 1992); MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET. AL.,
PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1992); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1991);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYER-
ING (1990); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (3d
ed. 1989); and JOHN F. SUTTON & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS (1989); ROBERT H. ARONSON ET.
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1985).
Even humanistic, as opposed to instrumentalist, approaches to this area are perme-
ated by this client-centered perspective. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and
the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 319 (1987) ("The distinctive feature of ethics in a
profession is that it speaks to the unequal encounter of two moral persons. Legal ethics
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topics such as the "three hardest questions" treated. 2
Such consensus among diverse academics does not necessarily re-
flect a collective absence of imagination. Without clients, presumably
lawyers would not exist. It is only through the exploration of the
boundaries between ourselves and our clients (the "other") that we
can begin to define our core selves. Thus the parameters of the law-
yer-client relationship are of central importance to the question of our
identities as lawyers.
Nonetheless, this singular focus has certain consequences. One
of them is that we tend to undervalue or perhaps even ignore the
other methods available to us of constructing ethical identities. Rec-
ognizing this shortcoming, some legal ethicists have endeavored to
turn the lawyer's focus inward, to examine self-identity as a moral
touchstone to lawyer-role. 3 A prototypical exercise of this sort is to
examine the motivations of Sir Thomas More, who is claimed to have
possessed "an adamantine sense of his own self"4 that transcended his
social role as a lawyer. This analysis presumes that a self is somehow
natural and good whereas a role is somehow artificial and potentially
corrupting.5 But a self is as constructed, and is in that sense as artifi-
cial, as a role. The personae that we assume as lawyers are as inevita-
ble as our other social masks (teacher masks, parent masks and so
on); the masks we choose are as revealing as they are confining of self.
A core (if contingent and partial) self is constantly performed through
an agora of roles. This core self also expresses an ethical self because
each performance embodies ethical dimensions, whether or not we ac-
... often becomes the study of what is good - not for me, but for this other person, over
whom I have power.... Legal ethics is thinking about my client's morals, but I am the
one who is thinking.").
2. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). One of the few
areas of multiple-role lawyering that casebooks consistently address is the problem of the
peruring client as an example of an ethical clash between an attorney's simultaneous
duties of candor toward the court and toward the client as her advocate.
3. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
(1988); ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPEC-
TIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
4. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS xi (1962) quoted in DVORKIN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 15.
5. See, e.g., Thomas Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 721, 731 (1975) in DVORKIN, ET AL., supra note 3, at 5 ("If I close my eyes
and imagine a lawyer, I expose myself to a role. If I close my eyes and see me, I expose
myself to an identity. And if I close my eyes and see myself as a lawyer, I expose myself
to the conflict between my role and my identity.").
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knowledge much less claim responsibility for them.6
Role-playing - in the sense of us playing the roles rather than
the roles playing us - is the process of expressing our identities, in-
cluding our ethical identities. A corollary is that there cannot be a
single lawyer role. Professional identity is discovered or made not
only in response to our clients, but also through our reactions to
(among other things) other attorneys, the legal profession in general,
the justice system, and to the larger society in which we live - and
through their reactions to us. 7 The preamble to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct reminds us, moreover, of the inevitability of
role friction:
[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between
a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system AND TO
THE LAWYER'S OWN INTEREST IN REMAINING AN UPRIGHT PER-
SON WHILE EARNING A SATISFACTORY LIVING.... Within the
framework of these Rules, many difficult issues of professional dis-
cretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exer-
cise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules.
8
No less than the search for an authentic ethical professional self - a
fed, housed and clothed self that tries to do the right thing - is at
stake.9
6. At bottom, I doubt that my position is much different from Professor David
Luban's assertion that there is a difference between a "role morality" and the "morality
of persons qua persons." LUBAN, supra note 3, at 127. See generally id. at 104-27. Both
Luban and I would not want lawyers to take refuge in their role as zealous advocate for
their clients as a means to evade tough ethical decisions. Perhaps I resist his terminology
because it allows the precise moral reduction that he criticizes: separating the person
from the role allows that person more easily to evade moral responsibility for his or her
actions by blaming those actions on the requirements of the role. I am positing a person
who is morally inseparable from a role, so as to force the role itself to be more ethically
responsive.
7. Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr. has explored, for example, the different roles a
lawyer plays in a class action lawsuit, which challenges the simple model of an attorney-
client relationship. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Cli-
ent Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 8 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] (emphasis added).
9. The preamble reminds me also of a description of Mikhail Bakhtin's philosophi-
cal explorations:
Emphasizing how both individuals and their historical situation were unique
and could not be repeated ("What can be accomplished by me cannot be accom-
plished by anyone else, ever"), he argued that moral responsibility was
threatened by all forms of "theoretism" - by which he meant ... a kind of
1992] 1139
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What each of the following articles does is to posit the identity of
the lawyer not just as client representative, but in the multiple roles of
respondent to other people, entities and underlying societal values.
Professor Vestal questions the keystone of the lawyer-client relation-
ship - the duty of confidentiality - through an examination of an
academic lawyer's role in the larger world to further human knowl-
edge through academic discourse. In proposing "The Twelve Com-
mandments of Professional Behavior," Professor Pertnoy challenges
another core concept in the lawyer-client relationship - the duty of
loyalty via zealous representation, taken to an extreme by "hardball"
litigators - through attention to lawyers' duty to other lawyers. In
addition to analyzing their ethical impact on attorney-client relation-
ships, Professors Gaetke and Welling examine the effect of money
laundering laws on the attorney's duty toward the court and the crim-
inal justice system. Each article contributes to the formation of our
selves qua lawyers by showing how we can and do respond to foils
other than clients.
II. SECRETS AND KNOWLEDGE
Professor Vestal's article fits within the growing legal academic
literature of narrative jurisprudence. Developed within the theoreti-
cal movements of law and literature, feminist legal theory and critical
race theory, this rhetorical method reduces the gap between the pub-
lic self and the private self by allowing the storyteller to relate particu-
lar and often, personal circumstances to a larger theoretical
framework. 10 More often than not, the author intends to disrupt re-
ceived legal doctrine, challenging the hidden assumptions of given
theoretical constructs with actual incidents of lived experience. To
use an analogy borrowed from the writer Toni Morrison, these narra-
tives may shift our typical focus on what is floating inside a fishbowl
thinking that always understands events as instances of universal rules and prin-
ciples. He insisted that, although rules can be helpful, we develop as moral
beings by increasing our responsiveness to the irreducible particularities of each
case.
Aileen Kelly, Revealing Bakhtin, N.Y. RExV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 24, 1992, at 44, 46. Cf
THOMAS C. GREY, WHAT GOOD Is LEGAL PRAGMATISM?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW &
SOCIETY 9 (Michael Brint and William Weaver eds., 1991).
10. See, e.g., Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. Legal Educ. I & 2
(March/June 1990) (whole issue devoted to articles on narrative jurisprudence); Sympo-




to the parameters of the glass that encloses it."1
Professor Vestal tells us how he unintentionally and somewhat
unwillingly became embroiled in a dispute with a former client about
the proper limits of his duty of confidentiality. In reaching his ulti-
mate ethical position on this issue, he is forced to grapple with his
current identity as an academic lawyer in relation to his former iden-
tity as a practicing lawyer. In this interplay of roles, he reaches in-
sights about the lawyer's duty of confidentiality that are only
marginally addressed in the standard professional responsibility texts.
He writes:
the protection of confidences and secrets is more a real concern for
practitioners than for academics. Practitioners deal daily with sub-
stantial, real-world consequences of failed secrecy in ways that
most academics do not .... [B]ecause practitioners deal with the
real-world consequences of failed secrecy, for them there is little to
be gained from carefully parsing the rules to allow the freest flow
of information. 12
Despite his sympathy for the concerns of practicing lawyers, however,
he finds that the role of academic lawyers necessarily challenges these
concerns. Forced to articulate his ethical position, he sets outer limits
on the duty of confidentiality that are potentially much broader than
the simple "public domain" exception recognized by courts, bar ethics
committees and treatise writers. He would define these outer limits
by reference to principles of academic freedom and the political
speech essence of the First Amendment free speech guarantee, rather
than by reference to the former client's self-serving and questionable
need for absolute secrecy.13
While absolute confidentiality is not the only possible default set-
ting,14 the First Amendment is itself an arbitrary delimiter of confi-
11. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION 17 (1992).
12. Allan W. Vestal, Former Client Censorship of Academic Scholarship, 43 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 1247, 1261 (1992).
13. As Professor Vestal explains, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1980) [hereinafter Model Code] currently places ethical limits on lawyers' expression of
unprivileged knowledge gained from client representation when the information is "em-
barrassing" or "detrimental," DR 4-101(A), or "disadvantageous," EC 4-5, to the client.
Model Rule 1.6(a) is silent with respect to the scope of unprivileged information to be
kept confidential; however, Rule 1.8(b) prohibits a lawyer from using information "to the
disadvantage of the client," and Rule 1.9(c)(1) specifically lifts the duty of confidentiality
with respect to information that "has become generally known."
14. As in the exception of disclosure of confidences to prevent imminent harm, the
1992] 1141
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dentiality. Echoing the implosion of the private/public distinction
amplified by the rhetorical device of storytelling, constitutional law
scholars question whether the state action requirement "is a logical
stopping place"1 5 for invoking federal constitutional protections in-
cluding those of the first amendment. Similarly, a growing number of
intellectual property scholars claim that the state action requirement
in a first amendment defense to infringement is obsolescent in the con-
text of our late-twentieth century form of capitalism, which is charac-
terized by the exponential private concentration of communication
and information resources. 16 Professor Vestal asks: "Experience is
the crux of this issue: are the lawyer's experiences working for the
client somehow the property of the client, or are they the property of
the lawyer?" 17 This is not a question, however, to which an answer
can be buttressed solely by reference to ethical codes, or even tradi-
tional first amendment jurisprudence, alone. The issue of the correct
legal limits to an individual's expression of her knowledge and experi-
ence is one that cuts across many doctrinal categories, and has caused
anguish to potential defendants other than Professor Vestal. He
shares, for example, the same dilemmas as the rapper Luther Camp-
bell (a/k/a "Luke Skyywalker," a stage name that formed the basis of
general rule of confidentiality represents a number of different and competing concerns,
which we may or may not want to honor. The Model Rules, for example, do not recog-
nize a duty to disclose a client's intent to engage in criminal activity absent the lawyer's
belief that there may be imminent harm - and even then the lawyer is not required to
disclose that activity. Professor Ray Patterson has posited that this ethical formulation
may be based on the absence of a legal duty of the client himself or herself to disclose
intent to commit a crime - a justification that he criticizes as being too facile. L. Ray
Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role of the
Client, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 43, 48 (1987).
15. Private Power and the Constitution, MULTIPLE CULTURES AND THE LAW: Do
WE HAVE A LEGAL CANON? (Ass'n of Am. L. Schs. Annual Meeting Program, San
Francisco, Cal.), Jan. 5, 1993, at 31; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitu-
tion is Color-Blind" 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 7-16 (1991).
16. See, e.g., John Markoff, "Microsoft and 2 Cable Giants Close to an Alliance,"
New York Times, June 13, 1993, at 1, 31; Jon Wiener, "Murdered Ink," The Nation,
May 31, 1993, at 743 (describing the Walt Disney Company's successful efforts to "kill"
books); Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Prop-
erty Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1867-69 (1991) (While Prof.
Coombe's argument cannot be encapsulated into a parenthetical, and requires some fa-
miliarity with postmodernism and semiotic theory, at least one quotation may assist the
reader: "If what is quintessentially human is the capacity to make meaning, challenge
meaning, and transform meaning, then we strip ourselves of our humanity through over-
zealous application and continuous expansion of intellectual property protections." Id. at
1879.).
17. Vestal, supra note 12, at 1287.
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a trademark infringement suit), 18 the proponents and opponents of
the Strategic Defense Initiative (whose use of the term "Star Wars" to
describe this military project was also a basis for a trademark infringe-
ment suit),19 and fanzines that occasionally depict Luke Skywalker
and Han Solo in a sexual relationship 20 - all of whom at different
times and in different ways have earned the ire of Lucasfilm Ltd., the
corporate entity that created the movie "Star Wars" and its charac-
ters. The full answer to Professor Vestal's question occupies a
number of different legal niches, all of which cumulatively define the
'proper' sphere of individual intellectual freedom.21
The characters in former Czechoslovakian president Vaclav
Havel's plays often repeat word-for-word sentences or phrases that
other characters previously had uttered. This device, while off-put-
ting at first, teaches the viewer that human social reality is con-
structed through language and other signs - specifically through the
"constant, ceaseless creation and exchange of meaning" 22 among indi-
viduals. That is, we all should be, and in fact we all are, information
18. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Campbell, No. 90-1511 (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 27, 1990). Like
the majority of filed cases, this case was settled; therefore law professors like me have
little to trace or torture. This raises the question of the incompleteness of the data or
evidence lawyers use to support their arguments. While decided cases have precedential
value (useful to a practicing lawyer), undecided cases might tell us more about economic
and political power and its shaping of the law (useful to an academic lawyer).
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a copyright infringement case in-
volving Campbell; the case raises analogous issues of an artist's freedom of expression.
See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn.), appeal dis-
missed, 929 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
19. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
20. Henry Jenkins III, Star Trek Rerun, Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as Textual
Poaching, in FILM, FEMINISM AND SCIENCE FICTION 170, 177 (Constance Penley et al.,
eds. 1991). Fanzines are fan magazines for various pop-cultural works. Examples that
Jenkins explores are written mostly by and for heterosexual middle-class female science
fiction fans, and revolve around a particular television series or movie. See generally id.
21. In my own work in the intellectual property field, for example, I am contextual-
izing the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution within some of the assumptions
and values of the Enlightenment as against postmodernity, to argue that promoting the
free flow and exchange of knowledge should be a greater constitutional value than that of
providing incentives to individual authors and inventors. See Margaret Chon,
Postmodern "Progress" Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power (forthcoming in 43
DEPAUL L. REV. (1993)); see also Margaret Chon, Disembodied Marks: Consumer Con-
fusion over Source of Origin of Trademarks (1992) (unpublished manuscript describing
increased cultural use of trademarks, on file with the author).
22. Coombe, supra note 16, at 1877 n. 140 (quoting MICHAEL HOLQuIsT, DIALO-
GISM: BAKHTIN AND HIS WORLD 41 (1990) (paraphrasing Bakhtin)).
1992] 1143
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poachers.23 All of us plagiarize; none of us is truly original much as
we (especially academics) may aspire to that hubris.24 Professor Ves-
tal's former client objected to his poaching, but in fact the knowledge
he gained through representing his client is information that "be-
longs" truly neither to the client nor to the lawyer. If anything, it
belongs to a commons of information from which we all draw to cre-
ate our shared culture.
Ironically, the narrower duty of confidentiality embodied in the
attorney-client privilege is frequently justified on systemic grounds
rather than by reference to the preferences of individual clients. The
privilege is supposed to further the policy of encouraging full and
frank disclosure between attorneys and clients. 25 Against this tradi-
tional justification for secrecy, Professor Vestal counterbalances our
perhaps more essential systemic need for the meaning-making process
of social construction. Despite the prominent place confidentiality oc-
cupies in the pantheon of legal ethical duties, this process should not
be disrupted arbitrarily by clients' requests for secrecy.
III. INCIVILITY AND iTs DIscoNTENTS
In the movie Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles III, four samurai
from sixteenth century feudal Japan are transported to New York
City in the 1990s, and watch hockey on television. The Turtles' side-
kick Casey Jones decides that they have been couch potatoes long
enough, thus he organizes a hockey drill. He dons a goalie mask and
awaits shots from the samurai standing at the other end of the room,
sticks in hand; when he signals them to start playing, however, they
begin to fight with each other much as they saw the NHL players
fight on TV.
Civility codes are aspirational codes of behavior that proponents
claim will allow us to stop fighting and start playing. Professor
Pertnoy justifies these codes by a fundamental premise: lawyers owe a
higher duty to "the legal profession than to money, success, or even
23. Id. at 1856 n.23. The term that Professor Coombe poached from Michel de
Certeau, and that I poach partially, is "textual poaching." See also HENRY JENKINS,
TEXTUAL POACHERS: TELEVISION FANS & PARTICIPATORY CULTURE (1993).
24. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 235
(1991).
25. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450,
1471-80 (1985). To this systemic justification is often added an individual-focused pri-
vacy rationale. Id. at 1480-83.
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their clients."' 26 But the lawyer freshly graduated from law school,
who in the course of three years has been transformed into a debtor
par excellence and who has studied from professional responsibility
casebooks that stress the primacy of the attorney-client relationship,
might wonder: from where does this higher duty arise? The Model
Rules, the Model Code and the Canons are permeated with the adver-
sarial ethic expressed by Lord Brougham:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in
the discharge of that office but one person in the world, that client
and none other. To save that client by all expedient means, to pro-
tect that client at all hazards and costs, to all others, and among
others to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his du-
ties .... 27
Can we reconcile Professor Pertnoy's perspective with that of Lord
Brougham?
We generally understand civility to mean behavior that Miss
Manners would encourage or at least condone. If that is all that civil-
ity is, then the call for greater civility in the legal profession could
easily be relegated to the realm of the "Bar Association after-dinner
speech - inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real."
'28 Civil-
ity, however, has a much more sumptuous meaning that ties our im-
mediate problem of "Rambo," "hardball," "scorched earth," "take
no prisoners," "S.O.B." style of litigation29 to broader values underly-
26. Leonard Pertnoy, Order in the Court, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1159, 1159 (1993).
27. He continues:
[A]nd he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction
which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a pa-
triot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he
must go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to
involve his country in confusion for his client's protection.
2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1921) (quoted in Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Ex-
change on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext and Context, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 29 (1991)).
Professor Rhode analyzes the historical context of Lord Brougham's remark, which is
usually but not necessarily accurately interpreted to support a "Rambo" ethic of adver-
sarial litigation. Id. I was interested to find that Queen Caroline, for whom Lord
Brougham was acting as counsel at the time he made this statement, had some parallel
life experiences to the current Princess of Wales (who is one of my favorite pop icons),
including the assistance of savvy legal advisors.
28. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 277 (1992) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, The Inde-
pendence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988)).
29. All of these tags derived from sports and the military have been used as syno-
nyms for incivility. See generally SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INTERIM REPORT OF
1992] 1145
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ing the lawyers' system of ethical self-governance. In fact, civility has
so many shades of meaning that the editors of the Oxford English
Dictionary find it necessary to divide the definition of civility into two
parts: the first compiled of "senses[] connected with citizenship and
civil polity" and the second compiled of "senses connected with civili-
zation, culture." 30 Courtesy, politeness and decency are literally at
the bottom of the list of possible denotations. At the top? Citizen-
ship, a community of citizens, civil organization, government, social
order, and civil righteousness.
Being a citizen within the polity of American lawyers in the
1990's is not exactly analogous to being a citizen of ancient Athens or
Rome. Although it is true that our group identity necessarily influ-
ences our individual self identities, and vice versa,31 our "groupness"
is in an accelerated state of flux whereas most republican visions of
polity require some degree of stasis at least with respect to founda-
tional values. 32 When Judge Harry Edwards writes: "It goes without
saying that an affiliation with a professional group gives meaning to
one's life. Thus, in my view, it seems almost loathsome for a lawyer
to embrace an ideology of indifference," 33 I could not agree more.
But to illustrate why group affiliation might be difficult, I propose the
following hypothetical: what if the citizenry of ancient Athens sud-
denly included women and slaves? One classicist has argued that the
women of Athens may have expressed a very different set of values
than the men: one that did not celebrate the "male model canonized
by society and embodied by Heracles and Theseus, brawny, aggressive
strong-men.134 I am not trying to make the claim that the entry of
THE COMM. ON CIVILITY, 143 F.R.D. 371, 391, 393 (1992) [hereinafter INTERIM RE-
PORT]. Perhaps the feminist versions of these terms could include "FloJo" (for aggressive
but not unduly mean), "Amazon" (for aggressive and mean) or "Thelma and Louise"
(for aggressive, mean and out for revenge) litigation. But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
The False Metaphor of Warfare, in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 17 (1990).
30. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 447 (1933).
31. "He who is without a polis... is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher
than man: he is like the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation: 'Clanless and law-
less and heartless is he.'" ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 5 (Ernest Barker trans., 1961), quoted
in Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1148, 1157 (1990).
32. Pearce, supra note 28, at 260.
33. Edwards, supra note 31, at 1157.
34. EVA C. KEULS, THE REIGN OF THE PHALLUS: SEXUAL POLITICS IN ANCIENT
ATHENS 24 (1985). Professor Keuls bases her argument on vase paintings and other
pictorial evidence; the women of Athens held a countercultural festival called Adonia,
which celebrated Adonis (a distinctly non-macho mortal lover of the goddess Aphrodite),
1146 [Vol. 43:1137
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women as well as racial and ethnic minorities into the profession
either exacerbates or reduces incivility although some (including my-
self) suspect that the renewed emphasis on civility in its narrower
sense is due in part to the distaste of established lawyers over the
demographic changes in the profession.3 5 I use this hypothetical only
to posit that strong differences in values held by individual lawyers in
the profession may prevent a quick consensus on civility in its broader
sense from emerging. To take another example for which there is evi-
dence other than vases, a cultural and generational gulf seems to sepa-
rate me from many of my students although we are only separated in
years by little over a decade. I identify with the "I can give you the
telephone number of two colored lawyers, and maybe they can help
you" story recounted by Judge Leon Higginbotham, 36 as well as simi-
lar stories of women and Jewish lawyers who graduated from law
school in the nineteen fifties or earlier. The stories with which many
of my students identify as they enter law school involve Arnie
Becker.37 In significant ways, our Venn circles of experience do not
in the same year the male citizens of Athens were embarking on a major military excur-
sion to Sicily; see also Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: the Intellectual Origins
of the Constitution 70 (1985) ("The vital... principle of republics was public virtue ....
Not coincidentally, public, like virtue, derives from Latin roots signifying manhood: 'the
public' included only independent adult males.")
35. See Monroe H. Freedman, A Brief Professional History, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17,
1990, at 22. Professor Deborah Rhode has also linked the origin of the various ethical
codes, and the selective enforcement of provisions such as character and fitness review, to
the interest of the organized bar in keeping out "undesirables." See Deborah L. Rhode,
Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985). Interestingly, the
Seventh Circuit Committee on Civility did not identify increasing diversity as a factor
either militating for or against aggressive lawyering styles.
36. A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., The Dream with its Back Against the Wall, YALE
LAW REPORT (Spring 1990) at 38 (discussing his encounter with a Yale representative in
Philadelphia just before graduation from law school). I also identify with Judge Higgin-
botham's reaction to that comment:
I went down the elevator in the Girard Trust Building, and I cried. I mean it. I
cried because I thought of my mother. I thought of all the dishes she had
washed, all the floors she had scrubbed, all the pain she had suffered. And after
seven years, I couldn't get a job.
Id.
37. Or maybe the irreverently inclined among them would look to Saturday Night
Live's Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer. The references to L.A. Law by numerous legal aca-
demics both within and without lecture halls are less gestures towards being au courant
than an implicit recognition that pop culture is what is definitively American about
American culture, including even legal culture. Some argue that L.A. Law is a source of
ethical insight. See Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607
(1989). Others even argue that "L.A. Law's Empire" presents a truer picture of law than
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overlap; between their matriculation and graduation lies a huge, un-
charted territory to be negotiated among us. Such a negotiation re-
quires a good deal of good faith - a condition that seems increasingly
quaint.38
Although it is difficult to discern what the distinguishing features
are or should be of the 'clan' to which we are all supposed to belong,
one cannot fail to notice the tremendous economic flux within the
legal profession in the past thirty years. The 82 judges and 1297 law-
yers surveyed by the Seventh Circuit Committee on Civility identified,
inter alia, the corporatization of law practice, the expanding size of
the bar leading to increased economic competition, and client pres-
sures as the primary reasons for increasing incivility.3 9 Law practice
increasingly resembles market-oriented commerce; the lawyers sur-
veyed believed this to be the single largest cause of incivility.40 The
legal community is growing in size and is growing rapidly;41 the Sev-
enth Circuit found younger lawyers and out-of-district lawyers more
often inappropriately aggressive than older or within-district law-
yers.42 The rapidly growing size of the bar and of student loan indebt-
that depicted in the standard legal academic pieces. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the
Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. REv. 801, 868-69 (April 1991).
38. The requirement of good faith, far from constraining instrumentalism, be-
comes just another occasion for it. More generally, any constraint on instru-
mentalism can itself be treated instrumentally; no Archimedean point can be
found to budge the instrumentalist one millimeter. For no matter what the
verbal formula is that expresses the constraint, the instrumentalist lawyer re-
sponds by treating it as a manipulable legal term rather than as a moral limit.
LUBAN, supra note 3, at 17. Luban is criticizing unfettered partisan lawyering with this
statement.
39. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 29, at 391-95.
40. "The law profession is now a competitive business with enormous pressures on
lawyers to meet large payrolls and carry a large overhead." Id. at 392 (quoting an anony-
mous survey participant). My colleague Robin Malloy suggests however that this com-
ment is similar to IBM's recent lament that the computer industry is no longer civil,
coinciding with its loss of market power. The relatively fluid, open-textured market char-
acteristics rather than the closed guild characteristics of the legal profession might be
what ultimately allowed in "outsiders" such as women and minorities, creating pressures
on established players.
41. The number of licensed attorneys in the United States increased almost 75% in
the decade between 1980 and 1990. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 29, at 382.
42. Judge Daniel H. Huyett III of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has had
standing orders on civility in his courtroom with respect to which the "Explanatory
Note" on the front page states: "many younger attorneys, and those not frequently in this
court, are not familiar with what is expected of them and this is designed to guide them."
Daniel H. Huyett III, Procedures Which Shall Govern in the Trial of Cases Before Judge
Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd (Jury and Non-Jury) (rev. ed. 1987). An older lawyer in my firm
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edness coincides with a shrinking economic base, client loyalty and
law firm size in many parts of the country.43 Succinctly put: clients
are less willing or able to pay lawyers, more of whom owe money
from the starting line. The pressures on young lawyers to disregard
Professor Pertnoy's premise are enormous. If anything, the ethical
impetus created by these larger sociological and economic factors
seems to be towards the private good (that of individual lawyers and
clients) and away from the public good (that of the legal profession
and society-at-large). The growing heterogeneity of the bar might
make the task of creating civility progressively complex, but these
other factors may actually discourage new forms of civility from even
being attempted.
The emergence of civility codes and the growing discussion of
professionalism, however debatable as a matter of remedy or prophy-
lactic,44 at least cause our glazed focus on the client to blink once or
twice. If indeed our ethical outlook (for whatever reasons) is trained
upon the micro concerns of lawyer and client to the utter exclusion of
all else, we can acknowledge nonetheless that the norm of client loy-
alty is in fact an extremely convenient and over-simplified construct.
In practice, we lawyers can and often do exercise an immense discre-
tion with respect to our clients' wishes. The Model Code and the
Model Rules give us the ethical authority to modulate our clients'
immediate interests, 45 even as we purport to maximize them by reflex-
gave me an unsolicited copy of these orders. He also taught me that the first step in
discovery is to call the lawyer on the other side and discuss the voluntary exchange of
information without formal discovery requests much less Rule 11 motions.
43. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 29, at 382; see also Don DeBenedictis, Growing
Pains, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 52.
44. The Seventh Circuit report itself concluded that the judiciary and the bar did
not regard civility codes per se as a solution to the problem of incivility. Other recom-
mendations that received wider consensus include: law school civility training; law firm
training programs; and membership in Inns of Court or voluntary bar associations. IN-
TERIM REPORT, supra note 29, at 411-16; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Civility Code
May Lead to Less Civility, NAT'L L.J. Feb. 26, 1990, at 13.
45. See generally MODEL RULES, Rule 1.2 and accompanying Model comment;
Model Rule 2.1; MODEL CODE EC 7-8, 7-9. For example, Model Code EC 7-9 states:
"when an action in the best interest of the client seems to the lawyer to be unjust, the
lawyer may ask the client for permission to forgo such action."
As Professor Russell Pearce points out, that even as the "adversarial ethic allows
[us] to disclaim to the public any moral responsibility for [our] actions[,] ... retention of
a republican vision in the codes permit[s us] to exercise broad discretion to refuse client
instructions, whether that discretion is based on expertise, morality or self-interest."
Pearce, supra note 28, at 278. But see Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Virtue and the
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ively modelling ourselves after Sylvester Stallone. Extended discovery
disputes and routine Rule 11 motions - actions disliked by virtually
all the surveyed Seventh Circuit lawyers - ultimately serve few cli-
ents well, even the defendants with the deepest pockets.
46
Multidimensional lawyering causes us to view the concept of cli-
ent loyalty as multifaceted - as a myth, as a smokescreen, as
doublespeak, as an excuse for moral laxness as well as an aspiration.
While we may mouth the slogan that our utmost duty is to this client
now, one's choice really lies not between client or legal profession.
Damage to the legal profession will hurt the client - if not this one,
then the next.47
Lord Brougham would reject Professor Pertnoy's initial premise
that lawyers owe a higher duty to the legal profession than to their
own clients. Nonetheless, lawyers' multidimensionality - the neces-
sity of playing several roles simultaneously - shows that the con-
cerns of the client are inextricable from the concerns of the legal
profession much as one person's smoking affects all around her. In-
stead of a hierarchy of duties, therefore, we might insist on ethical
behavior that takes into account the secondary smoke of the lawyer's
unmitigated duty of loyalty to the client. The externalities associated
with an exaggerated focus on the needs of the client - the nicotine
habit - must somehow be valuated. As Professor David Luban has
stated, "the entire enterprise of self-regulation is built on the premise
that, when it comes to the practice of law, lawyers have some special
insight into the public good."'48
I happen to think the social flux giving rise to these discussions of
professionalism is mostly good as well as inevitable; it can and will
erase the bad aspects of status quo. Unlike Professor Pertnoy, I doubt
Client's Autonomy, in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 29, at 43 (articu-
lating how the various ethical codes limit lawyer discretion).
46. Discovery was the primary context for incivility, according to 94% of the survey
participants. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 29, at 380. Lawyers singled out depositions
and Rule 11 motions, in addition to identifying discovery in general, as especially prob-
lematic. Id. But see Randall Samborn, Reports: Little Discovery Abuse, NAT'L L.J., May
31, 1993 at 3, 36 (lack of widespread discovery abuse indicate that no changes are needed
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26).
47. This is not unlike the tragedy of the commons, where no one individual has the
incentive to maximize group interest by voluntarily limiting the number of cattle grazing
on the commons. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sc. 1243 (1968);
cf Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years Later, 18 HuM. ECOL-
OGY 1 (1990).
48. LUBAN, supra note 3, at 2.
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there was a time when the legal profession embodied greater civility. 49
But that is probably because I analogize myself more to an Attic wo-
man or slave than to a citizen.
However, a prerequisite to civility in the larger sense is civility in
the narrower sense. Whatever the reasons for the current vertigo in
the legal profession, the exchange of meaning through language is the
only civilized way out. It is, as well, the lawyer's primary tool. At
the least, we should not blunt this tool through gratuitous incivilities.
IV. My BOUNTIFUL LAUNDERETTE
Professors Gaetke and Welling examine the impact of various
federal "money-laundering" statutes on the lawyer-client relationship;
they conclude that these statutes either individually or collectively do
not threaten criminal defense lawyers' ethical duties toward their cli-
ents. But rather than leaving it at that, they go on to make several
claims. They conclude that the public's perception of lawyers might
fall if lawyers too boldly asserted that these laws negatively impacted
lawyering5 0 In this connection, they refer to the lawyer's role as "of-
ficer of the court," presumably a role that precludes lawyers from be-
ing compensated from proceeds of criminal activities.51 Finally, they
examine what they term "practical" rather than "ethical" impacts of
these laws, suggesting that the criminal justice system as a whole
might be harmed by these laws.52
A client-focused ethicist might ask whether these other analyses
that are entailed onto the detailed examination of the attorney-client
relationship are even relevant.5 3 As I have claimed above, however,
lawyers inevitably play roles other than that of advocate for the client.
49. See, e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 49-55 (Norman Page ed., Penguin
Books 1971) (1853) (describing the fabled interminable litigation of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce). A different and equally fascinating problem is the origin of current "bad
press" about lawyers as well as why negative images of lawyers and the legal profession
hold such a grip on our collective cultural imagination. See Marc Galanter, Fibs and
Fables in the Civil Justice Wars, Speech at the Sixth Round Table on Law and Semiotics
(Apr. 30, 1992).
50. Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1165, 1223-24 (1992).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1224-41.
53. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, The Perjury Trilemma, in UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 29, at 109, 111. Professor Freedman's view that the law-
yer-client relation is the paramount ethical concern is closely related to his view that the
adversary system is the best system for adjudication of civil and criminal disputes. See id.
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Moreover, multidimensional lawyering allows us to define and refine
the rather amorphous attorney's role as officer of the court, by giving
some substance to the attorney's duty not to engage in conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice. Furthermore, we may then de-
tect a thread that ties together this specific role as officer of the court
and a very different role as an ethical player within the justice system.
In an earlier article, Professor Gaetke had sifted out specific pro-
visions in the Model Code and the Model Rules that arguably could
be characterized as "officer of the court" ethical duties.5 4 Among
these, laundering money might fall under "conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice," which is proscribed under both the Model
Code and the Model Rules.55 What exactly is that proscribed con-
duct? The ethical considerations under Canon One of the Model
Code and the comment to Model Rule 8.4(d) do not help us to define
it. Professor Gaetke argues that this particular ethical duty is sub-
stantively empty because of already-existing criminal statutes as well
as civil and criminal procedural rules that guide a lawyer's zone of
discretionary activity vis-A-vis a court.56 That is, the prohibition of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice does not mean
much more in an ethical sense than it does in a legal sense. I believe,
however, that this duty is neither a nullity nor a tautology, but rather
is given content precisely through ethical examination of laws such as
the money laundering statutes examined here.
A much-discussed problem of professional responsibility is the
lawyer's duty not to aid a client in the violation of the law.57 Less
explored is the lawyer's duty herself not to violate the law.5 8 The
lawyer's role as "officer of the court" is prescribed by a complex net-
work of laws, even ones that are not necessarily intended to regulate
lawyers' behavior per se. Once we recognize this, the relevant ethical
at 13-42. But see Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission" Reflections
on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
54. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39, 48-71
(1989).
55. MODEL CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5); MODEL RULES, Rule 8.4(d).
56. Gaetke, supra note 54, at 56-57.
57. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.2(d); MODEL CODE, DR 7-102(A)(7).
58. Professor Charles Wolfram notes that, other than in the withdrawal provisions,
there is no general obligation, under either the Model Rules or the Code, that a
lawyer obey the law. Several provisions require obedience to various laws or
types of laws. The broadest of those are MR 8.4(b),(c) and (d) in the Model
Rules and DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (5) and (6) in the Code.
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.4, at 552 n.88 (1986).
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question then becomes whether, in any given instance, obeying those
laws is consistent with the ethical considerations underlying the law-
yer's duty to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.
Money laundering laws (which are applicable to lawyers and non-law-
yers alike) can be analyzed in this fashion, as can Professor Gaetke's
more commonplace example of procedural rules. If, for example, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are amended to streamline discov-
ery, 59 then litigators must limit the number of depositions and inter-
rogatories that they can serve on the opposing side absent the court's
permission. A lawyer in complex litigation, faced with a crotchety
judge who denies all motions for additional discovery requests, could
very well argue that compliance with the rule is more prejudicial to
the administration of justice than disobeying the rule. That is, obey-
ing the rule may prevent a full and fair discovery of the facts from
occurring, which would undermine our adversarial method of dispute
resolution and be inconsistent with the notice pleading framework for
the federal procedural system. 6°
Similarly, the criminal defense lawyer could argue that obeying
the money laundering laws is more prejudicial to the administration
of justice than disobeying them. While a lawyer has a generalized
obligation to obey all laws and rules of court, which to some extent is
encoded as the duty not to engage in conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice, that latter duty may actually require dis-
obeying the law or the rules. The ethical duty does not simply
collapse into whatever the law requires, nor does it imply that the
lawyer is an unthinking arm of the state.61
59. The Supreme Court has approved these controversial amendments to the federal
rules, and has transmitted them to Congress for final approval. See Samborn, supra note
46 at 3. At the same time the advisory committee was exposing these proposed amend-
ments to public notice and comment, the executive branch imposed the same types of
requirements on government attorneys in all civil cases to which the federal government
is a party. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992). President Clinton has not yet
modified or rescinded this order. Carl Tobias, The Clinton Administration and Civil Jus-
tice Reform, 144 F.R.D. 437, 443-44 (1993).
60. Cf Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (defense attorney jailed for refusal
to comply with discovery request, basing refusal on the then-amoebic work-product
doctrine).
61. Professor Freedman is scornful of the "officer of the court" label, stating that
"[t]he intended implication is that the lawyer serves principally as an agent of the state.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the lawyer's traditional function is to
serve the lawful interests of individual client, even against the interests of the state."
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, Understanding the Rules of Lawyers' Ethics, in UNDERSTAND-
ING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 29, at 1, 9.
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The constraints that Congress has placed on criminal defense at-
torneys via money laundering laws redefines a border of permissible
lawyering conduct. The law instructs the lawyer to refrain from cer-
tain conduct, for instance, from accepting fees over $10,000 that she
knows were derived from criminal activity. At the same time that
these laws have an undeniable if perhaps ethically inconsequential ef-
fect on the lawyer-client relationship, they also exert influence on the
lawyer's relationship to the institutions that make and enforce law.
As Professors Gaetke and Welling recognize, money laundering laws
pose ethical dilemmas even if they do not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, and even if the attorney-client relationship is
not significantly impacted by them, because they do impose limita-
tions on a lawyer's actions towards a court or other law-making body
- as do many laws.
The foregoing exegesis of a lawyer's role as officer of the court is
related to Professor Gaetke and Welling's second non-client-oriented
analysis: the impact of these laws on the criminal justice system. The
Supreme Court may be inadequately visionary about the role of the
Sixth Amendment in our delineation of an ethical adversarial sys-
tem. 62 Assuming nonetheless that these money laundering laws not
only are consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but
also (as Professors Gaetke and Welling assert) do not unduly interfere
with the attorney's other ethical obligations to the client, a client-cen-
tered ethicist might claim that they are not ethically problematic.
The Sixth Amendment forms the cornerstone of adversarial ethics.63
The argument might run that as long as the Sixth Amendment is not
implicated, then there is no fundamental ethical threat to the adver-
sary system.
The adversary system of justice is itself a considerable source of
ethical tension.64 One of the criticisms aimed at it is that it does not,
62. See Jay S. Silver, Equality ofArms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitu-
tional Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007, 1026-32. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion provides, inter alia, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have
the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, The Adversary System, in UNDERSTANDING LAW-
YERS' ETHICS, supra note 29, at 13, 13 ("An essential function of the adversary system,
therefore, is to maintain a free society in which individual rights are central. In that sense
the right to counsel is 'the most pervasive' of rights, because it affects the client's ability
to assert all other rights.").
64. Cf Rhode, supra note 27. Professor Deborah Rhode's article was based on a
presentation at the AALS Law School Mini-Workshop on Teaching Law and Ethics.
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in its current American form, adequately account for inequitable dis-
tribution of resources among parties to a lawsuit.65 According to
Professors Gaetke and Welling, the money laundering laws may cause
lawyers to decline particular clients or even to discontinue the prac-
tice of criminal defense. 66 If this is so, then these laws may exacerbate
the maldistribution of resources already all-too-apparent throughout
most of the criminal justice system.67 This 'practical' question is thus
a disguised ethical question. To the extent that the adversarial system
of criminal justice promotes the value of affirming individual rights
and individual dignity,68 that value is undercut, to say the least, by
removing the means by which some defendants might finance their
defense.
By using an ethical frame of reference that is system-focused
rather than client-focused, the criminal defense lawyer is then faced
with a dilemma. If the lawyer believes, based on the scattered empiri-
cal and anecdotal evidence that exists, that the criminal justice system
is harmed by these money laundering laws, then the lawyer might feel
compelled to disobey these laws so as not to engage in conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice. Such a system-centered ap-
proach to a legal ethical dilemma would be difficult for a judge or a
bar ethics committee to digest. We can tolerate almost any ethical
argument based on alleged interests of the client; much harder to dis-
cern and appreciate is an ethical argument based on the interests of
the system.
She was initially scheduled to oppose Lord Brougham's position; however, she agreed to
argue both sides of the proposition when Alan Dershowitz, who had prepared to support
Lord Brougham's position, was forced to withdraw. Id. at 29. Professor Rhode's clever
argument against herself displays in nutshell form the profession's schizophrenia about
the adversary system.
65. Prof. Freedman calls this "The Problem of Socio-Economic Unfairness."
FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 41-42.
66. Gaetke & Welling, supra note 50, at 1233-34.
67. See generally Silver, supra note 62, at 1009 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court
has shifted the balance between the defense and prosecution in favor of the state).
68. FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 16-17 ("The singular strength of the adversary
system is measured by a central fact that is usually deplored. The overwhelming majority
of those accused in American courts are guilty. Why is this a strength? Because its
opposite.., is this: Without an adversary system, a considerable number of defendants
are prosecuted, though palpably innocent." (quoting Jethro K. Lieberman, Book Review,




One of the touted changes from the Model Code to the Model
Rules is the explicit acknowledgement, if not the means of expression,
of many more lawyer roles than simply the role of advocate on the
client's behalf. At least as expressed in the Preamble to the Model
Rules, the lawyer is an officer of the court, a citizen of society as well
as of the legal profession, and an individual with certain ethical im-
peratives, in addition to being a client's representative within the legal
system. This shift from the model of a knight in shining armor to the
sensitive new age guy or gal is ridiculed by some, criticized as inade-
quate by others, and characterized as an incarnation ' la Shirley
MacLaine of republican values by yet others. But if we develop the
apparent impulse of the American Bar Association through each of
these diverse articles - the impulse toward multidimensional lawyer-
ing - we discover some new sources of ethical wisdom.
Interestingly, each of these articles echoes Professor Wasser-
strom's compelling observations of a lawyer's amoral "role-differenti-
ated" 69 behavior. Wasserstrom believes that the lawyer's focus on the
well-being of the client to the exclusion of all other moral criteria
"can succeed only if the enormous degree of trust and confidence in
the [legal] institutions themselves is itself justified.1 70 Professors
Gaetke and Welling indirectly caution us that lawyers have an ethical
obligation to determine whether legal institutions and law-making
bodies promulgate rules that are worthy of the trust and confidence of
the lawyer. Wasserstrom's second point is that "there are definite
character traits that the professional such as the lawyer must take on
if the system is to work. What is less clear is that they are admirable
ones." Professor Pertnoy shows us that even lawyers do not admire
the professional personality traits that they have voluntarily adopted.
Another of Wasserstrom's critiques is that "even if... the lawyer's
way of thinking and acting is ultimately deemed to be justifiable
within the system on systemic instrumental grounds, it still remains
the case that we do pay a social price for that way of thought and
action." Professor Vestal demonstrates that if we invoke these sys-
69. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTs. 1, 3 (1975). Wasserstrom uses role as a foil to person, in much the same way Luban
does. Thus, according to Wasserstrom, a lawyer's identity with his or her role eliminates
critical thinking about ethics. Id.
70. Id. at 13.
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temic grounds solely in relation to the client, we may miss other po-
tentially broader and more socially useful ways to act as lawyers.
The following articles remind us, in short, that our legal personae
are reinvented through reference to ethical claims on us in addition to
those made by clients.

